Halacha For Today

וירא העם כי בשש משה לרדת מן ההר ויקהל העם על אהרן ויאמרו אליו קום עשה לנו אלהים אשר ילכו לפנינו כי זה משה האיש אשר העלנו מארץ מצרים לא ידענו מה היה לו (32:1)

Rashi writes (Bamidbar 19:2) that Hashem declared the mitzvah of parah adumah to be a “chok” – Divine decree with no readily apparent rationale – regarding which we are not permitted to inquire or attempt to understand. Shlomo Hamelech declared (Bamidbar Rabbah 19:3) that after using all of his intellectual capabilities to attempt to understand this mitzvah, he was still unable to do so.

Yet Rashi also writes in the name of Rav Moshe HaDarshan that the parah adumah served as atonement for the sin of the golden calf, and he proceeds to explain how each detail of its laws specifically atoned for a corresponding aspect of the golden calf. After writing that the parah adumah is the quintessential chok, the purpose of which even Shlomo couldn’t grasp, how can Rashi proceed to explain the rationale behind the mitzvah in great detail? Secondly, in what way did this mitzvah specifically effect atonement for the golden calf?

            The Beis HaLevi explains that when the Jews incorrectly concluded that Moshe died, they were distraught by the lack of an intermediary to lead them and teach them Hashem’s will. They yearned to build a place for the Divine presence to rest among them to fill the void left by Moshe’s perceived death. Because their intentions in building the calf were for the sake of Heaven, they selected Aharon to lead the project so that it would succeed. If so, what was their mistake, and why did their plans go so awry?

            The Beis HaLevi explains that each mitzvah contains within it deep, mystical secrets which have tremendous effects in the upper worlds when performed properly. At Mount Sinai, the Jewish people erred in thinking that if they discovered the Kabbalistic concepts behind a mitzvah, they could perform it based on their understanding even without being commanded. As a result, although their intentions were proper, they lacked the Divine assistance which comes only from performing His will, and they ended up sinning with the golden calf.

            The Medrash (Shemos Rabbah 51:8) teaches that the Mishkan also served as atonement for the golden calf. The Beis HaLevi explains that because the sin of the golden calf was caused by doing something without a command from Hashem to do so, the Torah repeatedly emphasizes in Parshas Pekudei (e.g. 39:5) that every aspect of the Mishkan was made exactly as Hashem commanded Moshe.

            With this introduction, we can answer our original questions. The mitzvah of parah adumah is indeed a chok, the logic of which escaped Shlomo and certainly Rav Moshe HaDarshan. If so, what does he mean when he says that the red heifer comes to atone for the golden calf? As we now understand that the root of the sin of the golden calf was the Jews’ attempt to “outsmart” Hashem by doing something which He didn’t command them to, the ultimate rectification of this sin is to completely subordinate one’s intellect to Hashem’s dictates. This was manifested by their willingness to perform a chok, a mitzvah which appears to make no sense but which we do solely because Hashem commanded it.

Parsha Points to Ponder (and sources which discuss them):

1)      Rashi writes (30:31) that the anointment oil will remain for use in the Messianic era. What will it be used for? (Ramban Sefer HaMitzvos 3:7, Minchas Chinuch 107, Ayeles HaShachar)

2)      The Gemora in Yoma (85b) derives from 31:16 that we are required to desecrate Shabbos to save a fellow Jew’s life. If a Jewish court has convicted somebody of a capital crime and sentenced him to death, may one still desecrate Shabbos in order to save his life? (Biur Halacha 329:4)

3)      When burning chometz before Pesach, must one take care not to burn meat and milk products together in order to avoid transgressing the prohibition (Rashi 34:26) against cooking meat and milk together? (Ma’adanei Asher 5769 Parshas Mishpatim)

4)      The Gemora in Gittin (60b) derives from 34:27 that it is forbidden to say parts of the Written Torah by heart. Is it permitted to say Tehillim from memory? (Shu”t Chavos Yair 175, Chai Odom 8:11, Mateh Ephraim 619:23, Kaf HaChaim Orach Chaim 49:6, Mishnah Berurah 49:6, Piskei Teshuvos 49:1, Ma’adanei Asher 5768)

Answers to Points to Ponder:

1) The Ramban writes that the anointment received by Aharon and his sons became invalid at the time of their deaths. Upon their resurrection, they will require a new anointment to regain their status as Kohanim. Although he is unsure, the Minchas Chinuch discusses the possibility that Moshiach himself will need to be anointed. Alternatively, Rav Aharon Leib Shteinman cites the Ohr HaChaim HaKadosh, who writes that at that time, the first-borns will once again be able to perform the Divine service, in which case they will need to be anointed.

2) The Pri Megadim rules that just as the court may not actually execute somebody on Shabbos, so too it is forbidden to passively allow somebody who has been sentenced to death to die on Shabbos, as this is also considered a forbidden form of execution and we must desecrate Shabbos in order to extend his life if only temporarily. After quoting this opinion, the Chofetz Chaim disagrees, explaining that the Torah only commanded us to value each moment of life for somebody who himself values each second of his life. However, a person who has committed a capital sin for which he has been sentenced to death has demonstrated that he doesn’t properly value his life and is considered already dead, in which case it is forbidden to desecrate Shabbos to save him.

3) The Ma’adanei Asher cites the Kesef Mishneh (Hilchos Tumas Meis 1:2), who writes that the reason that the Torah prohibited cooking meat and meat together is due to a fear that one may come to eat the mixture, which is forbidden. Therefore, in a case where there is no concern that this may happen, such as when the mixture of milk and meat is being burned and destroyed, there should be no prohibition against cooking them together. He cites a ruling which permits cooking milk and meat which were previously cooked by a non-Jew, explaining that because they already became forbidden in consumption when they were cooked by the non-Jew, there is no longer a worry that they will be eaten together and cooking the combination is permissible. However, he cites a number of sources which question the logic of the Kesef Mishneh in light of a Gemora (Chullin 113b) which seems to forbid cooking meat and milk together even in a case where there would be no prohibition against eating the combination. He therefore suggests another reason that burning dairy and meat chometz together should be permissible, namely that the Torah only forbids cooking them together in the normal manner of cooking. However, in this case, one isn’t cooking them in the traditional sense, and it therefore shouldn’t fall under the Torah’s prohibition. However, for matters of practical conduct, one should ask his Rav.

4) The Chavos Yair permits saying Tehillim by heart, as it is permissible to say parts of the Written Torah by heart if they are well-known to all. Additionally, since Tehillim is said to arouse Divine mercy, it is considered a form of prayer, which may be said by heart. The Chai Odom argues that Tehillim is not sufficiently well-known and may not be said by heart; this is also the opinion of the Kaf HaChaim. The Mishnah Berurah rules like the Chovos Yair, as the Vilna Gaon maintains that the prohibition only applies when one is exempting others from an obligation, which isn’t the case here.

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